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An AJiihwHH CSitirn ISrforr 
OPrtobfr 1. 1919 



«9 

Formerly 

IHator J. A. CEommanliutg 3nrtl| Jwlft ArttlUry 

Amertran iEx^j^dittottar^ ^artt 



30'TtJL 



Stelit Jt^lb Arttlbrg 



In order to understand the method used in modern Field 
Artillery, it would be well to give a brief outline of the instruc- 
tions given to the oflficers and men. 

Practically all of the officers of my regiment had been candi- 
dates in an Officers' Training Camp, and most of the Battery 
Commanders and some of the Lieutenants had had a very com- 
plete course at the School of Fire for Field Artillery at Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma ; all having had range practice on the artillery range 
with the United States three-inch piece, each battery having fired 
about 500 rounds of ammunition before we sailed for France. 

Arriving in France, we had a complete course in the French 
Artillery methods, which were consideralbly different from our 
own. The French battle maps were made on the Lambert system 
of grids, which divided all the theatre of operation into squares 
representing one square kilometer each. The maps were gener- 
ally on a scale of 1 in 20,000, so that a kilometer was represented 
by about two inches on the map. 

We had a great deal of training in map firing both in the 
school and on the range, so that it was possible without seeing a 
target to range accurately on it. This necessitated, besides a care- 
ful study of the map, very accurate corrections for the atmo- 
spheric conditions. 

While in training on the range and at the front, observation 
balloons furnished, every three hours, the height of the barometer, 
the direction and velocity of the wind at different elevations, and 
the temperature of the air. In addition to these data, it is neces- 
sary to know the temperature of the powder, the weight of the 
projectile and the powder lot. From the figures the gunner refer? 
to his range table, which gives the muzzle velocity, the height of 
trajectory, angle of departure, the angle of fall and the probable 
error. 

Now, by hasty calculations made in accordance with the set 
mathematical formulas, you are able to figure very accurately 
just where your projectile is going to fall, but you must take into 



account that any change in any of the items above mentioned will 
affect in some way the direction or the distance traveled by your 
projectile. 

In addition to instructing the officers on the above subject, it is 
necessary that they be trained in observation of fire and in being 
able to give quick and accurate orders for adjustment of fire, and 
also to transfer their fire accurately and rapidly from one objec- 
tive to another. 

The officers must also know the use of the various optical 
instruments, which practically includes a short course in survey- 
ing, a complete understanding of the telephone instrument, the 
telegraph instrument, a knowledge of the International Morse 
Code, radio telegraphy, and the installation and upkeep of tele- 
phone and telegraph lines. 

They must then have thorough experience in the practical 
•working of the piece, so that they can in turn train the gun crews. 
This is very important, for all gun crews must be taught exactly 
alike, so that any officer can handle any crew. 

The average officer who came to us was not very well ac- 
quainted with the horse, and in addition to teaching him the 
fundamental iDrinciples of equitation it was necessary to go into 
the subject of principles of draft, the care of harness, the care 
and feeding of the horse, and general study of hippology and the 
care of the foot. 

Before mastering the above subjects it is understood that the 
officers should have the ordinary infantry training, especially the 
use of the rifle, revolver and machine gun, and the ordinary prin- 
ciples of camp and field sanitation. 

The officers then in turn must teach the enlisted men most 
of the subjects above mentioned, with the exception of the adjust- 
ment of fire. In. my own regiment reconnaissance details, tele- 
pJione, telegraph and radio details, and the scouts, the battery 
cooks, the battery barbers, mechanics, horseshoers, and in fact 
every man in each battery in addition to having training in his 
own particular branch, were taught to be of some service on the 
piece, and every man in the regiment had acted in some capacity 
in the gun crew. This gave us in each of our batteries four 
complete gun crews for each piece. 

It can be easily seen from the above schedule that a field 
artilleryman is a combination of infantry, cavalry, signal corps, 
engineer and a general mathematician. 



The main functions of light field artillery are the support of 
' the infantry ; to lay down a curtain of fire or a defensive barrage 
in case our own infantry are attacked; to remove obstacles such 
as barbed wire and machine gun nests in an advance, and to lay 
down a creeping or rolling barrage a short distance in front of 
the infantry wave when they are attacking. Light artillery is 
seldom used for counter battery work, as the light projectile 
has no serious eflfect on modern gun emplacements. It can, how- 
ever, be used very successfully in neutralizing the effect of field 
artillery fire in the open, in interdiction fire on cross roads, to 
impede the approach of supplies and reinforcements for the 
enemy, and is especially good in gas attacks. 

My regiment was equipped with French 75 millimeter guns, 
which are just a little smaller than three inches. The guns and 
caissons are each drawn by six horse teams, and the near horse 
is ridden. Seventy-two rounds of ammunition are carried in each 
caisson and twenty-four rounds in each limber. There are four 
guns in a battery, three batteries in a battalion and two battalions 
to a regiment. The battalion is the unit in actual operation and 
under normal conditions when it enters the line it carries 3,348 
rounds of ammunition. 

As far as possible a position is entered under cover of dark- 
ness. All the caissons and limbers are removed to an echelon 
some distance behind the line, leaving only the pieces in position. 
Camouflaged nets are immediately placed over the pieces and 
trenches are dug to protect the personnel and the ammunition 
which is stored near the guns. 

A liaison officer goes forward with the infantry, with his 
own telephone line, and is in constant touch between the in- 
fantry and the artillery which is supporting it. The liaison 
officer, perhaps, has the most exciting part in field artillery. I had 
one liaison officer who went forward in the very front wave of 
the infantry attack three times in three consecutive days. During 
his very first attack he was hit in the wrist with a fragment of 
shell. He made a tourniquet out of his handkerchief and continued 
in the attack, giving me first-hand information all through the 
three attacks. When the attack was halted he climbed a tree in 
plain view of the enemy, and continued sending information from 
that point, although he was fired on continuously with machine 
gun fire. He was with the infantry seven days, and during that 
time he had no chance to lie down to sleep. 

The telephone linemen also have very interesting occupations. 
It was necessary at one time to establish my observation post out 



beyond the front line of infantry. We were equipped with a 
telephone instrument connecting us with the battalion. Telephone 
communications were broken and the linemen in going from the 
observation post back to the battalion, which was only a distance 
of two kilometers, repaired sixty-five breaks in one telephone line. 
During the time they were working on the line the Germans were 
firing with one-pounders, 77-millimeter high explosive shells and 
150-millimeter shells. 

We very seldom had any sight of the enemy. Sometimes we 
would enter a position, open up and fire for two or three days 
Vv^ithout having had an opportunity to see where one of our 
shells was falling. I recollect one instance where, after two 
days' action, we had an opportunity to establish an observation 
post from which we could see that all the batteries were hitting 
exactly where they had calculated. This means that every three 
hours changes were made in the range and deflection to keep up 
with the atmospheric changes during the day and night, and that 
not one of the officers had made a mistake in any of these com- 
plicated calculations during that time. 

Another time it was reported to me by the Major of the in- 
fantry we were supporting that we shot up 157 machine gun nests 
in one afternoon, though we were not able to see one of these 
positions. In every case either the machine gun was put out of 
action or the crew were completely annihilated. 

I mention these examples to show how thoroughly these young 
officers had mastered the principles of field artillery, for it should 
be borne in mind that not one of them had any previous military 
training. 

From what I have said it can be seen that in order to be 
efficient an immense amount of training is requisite to make a 
satisfactory soldier nowadays. Anyone who says that the United 
States could raise an army of one million men over night is 
certainly misinformed, for the men are of absolutely no use 
unless they have been thoroughly trained. 

I have taken a great deal of time in explaining the technical 
part of field artillery, but most of modern field artillery is simply 
the application of ordinary business principles and a practical 
application of mathematics. Of course, there is some excitement 
at times, but one is generally so tired and worn out that it would 
be almost a relief to get hit with a shell and end the misery of 
being dead tired, hungry and thirsty. 

I dreaded the time when my battalion would be first sub- 
jected to shell fire, as I had some anxiety about the manner in 



which the men would stand up under it. We received our initial 
shelling albout three o'clock one morning. We had been making a 
forced march from our detraining point. The horses were green 
and had been on the train for over fifty hours. Our second bat- 
talion had detrained twenty-four hours before us, and I received 
orders on the march to overtake them and join them in position. 
We marched forty-five hours and joined our second battalion, 
which was just going into bivouac very close to a French battery 
in action. The Germans had a pretty good range on this battery, 
and we had just about finished unhitching when they started to 
shell. Instead of any fear being shown, the men joked about the 
screeching noise made by the shells on their approach, and I 
noticed not one remark that showed any fear whatsoever. I 
believe the men were so tired that they really didn't care. 

The next morning we went into position in the line and shell- 
ing became part of the regular day's routine. 

One of the characteristics of the average American is to boast 
about the prowess of everything connected with the United States. 
In our school history all the stress is laid on our victories and 
very little is said about our shortcomings. There were many 
instances at the front where very disastrous results should have 
occurred through inefficient planning of some of the attacks, but 
which turned out very favorably, for no other reason that I 
-:an see but sheer Yankee luck. There were many lessons taught 
us which should be more deeply considered to avoid future 
mistakes. One of the big causes for trouble was the lack of 
training of the average infantry officers and the general stafifs 
in being able to locate their positions accurately on the map. This, 
of course, was due to insufficient practice in map reading. I 
know in one case that both the Division Commander and his chief 
of staff had so little knowledge of the ability of field artillery 
that in planning an attack they ordered artillery preparation on a 
position which they covered with nearly the whole palm of their 
hand and said they would like to have concentrated fire in this 
position. As a matter of fact, they covered an area of something 
like four square kilometers or more. These maps are prepared 
with contour lines showing depressions and elevations in the ter- 
rain. They very frequently mistook a hill for a depression, and 
it is easily seen what the result would be if their instructions were 
carried out literally. 

Another very serious difficulty arose from the infantry com- 
manders ordering us to place a barrage on a certain location 
which was identified by the map and which, if this were carried 
out, would result in the artillery placing concentrated fire either 



within or behind our own lines. This mistake was so frequent 
that we would never fire on a spot indicated by the infantry 
unless our own artillery officers verified the position, as I have 
been requested by the infantry to fire on a position as far back 
as a thousand meters behind the point where they thought they 
wanted the fire. 

I have also been ordered to place my artillery as far as three 
kilometers beyond our own lines. At one time I had three officers 
walk directly into a German machine gun nest because they were 
ordered by a general in person to establish an observation post 
which really would have been within the German lines. 

Of course, it is a very difficult matter in strange territory, 
especially in wooded land, to be able to tell exactly where you are 
from a map and comipass, but it is highly essential in modern 
warfare to be able to do this, and the infantry and the general 
stafifs should be given the same training as the artillery in this 
respect. 

During the last fight on November 11, 1918, which was the 
morning the armistice was signed, our own and another regiment 
of artillery were in position in a valley surrounded on two sides 
and in the rear by steep hills. During the night the infantry thai 
we were supporting had been very badly shot up and some of the 
organizations of the regiment we were supporting had fallen back 
even behind our own gun positions. The balance were so dis- 
organized that even the officers did not know where the location 
of their respective organizations should have been, which meant 
that there was no organized infantry in our front and that our 
front line really consisted of two regiments of light artillery. 
Just through luck, either the Germans lacked the information or 
did not have sufficient strength to follow up this advantage, or 
they could have captured all our guns. 

When one considers our absolute unpreparedness at the time 
the United States went into this war, and the tremendous effort 
that we made to organize the army that we had in so short a time, 
it was simply marvelous to think of the way we were able to 
stand up at all against the trained German army. It was impos- 
sible to conceive of a better personnel than that which composed 
our army, but the lack of training was evident at nearly every 
turn. I am a strong advocate of national preparedness, and 1 
sincerely hope that a lesson will be learned from this war that 
will sufficiently arouse the people not to drift back to the old 
shiftless view held by the majority of citizens before our entrance 
into the war. 



The march to the Rhine, which should have been a victory 
parade, was really one of the greatest hardships that we encoun- 
tered during the war. The men suffered through lack of clothing, 
especially of shoes, and our animals were not sufficiently nour- 
ished, all due to the failure to properly accompany the troops 
with supplies. There is no complaint about this, as everybody 
realized that everything was being done that was possible under 
the circumstances, but simply to dismiss the subject with this 
excuse would be very unwise. 

The laurels of victory are bound to live and should live, but 
they should not completely overshadow unfortunate mishaps from 
which we should learn and remember some of the valuable les- 
sons which this war has taught us, and I am very much opposed 
to all praise and no constructive criticism. 



h!^.^ARY OF 



,?,?7GRess 



020 915 



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